A quality-based auction for search ad markets with aggregators
Oh la la
Your session has expired but don’t worry, your message
has been saved.Please log in and we’ll bring you back
to this page. You’ll just need to click “Send”.
Your evaluation is of great value to our authors and readers. Many thanks for your time.
When you're done, click "publish"
Only blue fields are mandatory.
Your mailing list is currently empty.
It will build up as you send messages
and links to your peers.
besides you has access to this list.
Enter the e-mail addresses of your recipients in the box below. Note: Peer Evaluation will NOT store these email addresses log in
Your message has been sent.
Full text for this article was not available? Send a request to the author(s)
: A quality-based auction for search ad markets with aggregators
Abstract : We explore the role of aggregators in search ad markets and their effects on that marketplace. Aggregators can have positive effects similar to those of an arbitrageur. We argue and provide empirical evidence that, unlike arbitrageurs, aggregators can continue to profit even in the absence of price imbalances. Furthermore, we argue that the standard generalized second price (GSP) auction mechanisms create incentives for aggregators to design their sites to negatively affect the user experience and that the existence of aggregators in the marketplace can also negatively affect nonaggregator merchants. We propose a specific quality-based GSP mechanism that reduces the negative impacts of aggregators on the user and marketplace while allowing some of their positive benefits for users.
Leave a comment
This contribution has not been reviewed yet. review?